August 31, 2007
Lebanese current events of August 31, 2007
Reflexions on the political and economic Lebanese
news
To understand constitutional legitimacy
of Lebanese presidential election
Plan:
I Facts.
II Texts of the Constitution and the Agreement of TAËF, relating to the
presidential election.
III Analysis of the LSTDO vis-a-vis the polemic of the interpretation of the
Constitution and the Agreement of TAËF concerning the presidential election.
I - Facts:
1
The political chiefs of the political group of March 14 claim a presidential
election according to the Constitution, even if it is necessary to have an
absolute majority of half plus a deputy, of the whole of the registered
deputies, following the absence of a reinforced majority of two thirds of the
deputies registered at the Parliament.
2
The political chiefs of the political groups of the opposition repeated their
refusal of the election of a president of the current majority at the Parliament
on the basis of half plus a deputy. They claim an agreement on a president who
must be supported by, at least, two thirds of the deputies registered at the
Parliament. What corresponds to the impossibility of the current majority of
continuing its policy without the agreement of the Shiites of HEZBOLLAH and
AMAL. The opposition is armed and supported by the Syrian and Iranian axis. Mr.
Talal IRSLANE, one of the Druses chiefs, opponent and prosyrian, declared that
the disorders with the law and order are better than to give the presidency to
the chiefs of the group of March 14 (Revolution of the cedar). The threat to
start a civil war is obvious.
3
The Free Patriotic Movement of General AOUN continue to be inserted in a
political tunnel without exit by worsening the divergences with the group of
March 14 by flamed media attacks which are, besides, reciprocal. General
AOUN is not any more one candidate possible of agreement and bearable by the
group of March 14. He criticizes neither HEZBOLLAH, neither the Syrian regime,
nor the Iranian regime who are at the origin of terrorism in Lebanon. He does
not specify if there is an agreement of disarmament of HEZBOLLAH. On the other
hand, he criticizes the American policy in Lebanon. He has the label of an ally
of Prosyrian groups whereas he fought them before his return of his fifteen years
exile!
4
The calls of the religious chiefs about an agreement between the majority and
the opposition do not appear to influence the increasingly nervous and
aggressive political groups, with the approach of the presidential elections.
5
The divergence of the policy concerning Lebanon between the governments of Egypt
and of Saudi Arabia on the one hand and the Syrian government on the other hand
was mediatized in August 2007, vis-a-vis the risks of destabilization of Lebanon
by Syria at the time of the presidential election campaign. The ambassador of
Saudi Arabia in Lebanon received threats. The governments of Saudi Arabia and
Egypt support SANIORA government and the resolutions of the United Nations.
6
The declarations of the French diplomacy, at the end of August 2007, of possible
openings of co-operations towards the Syrian government if this last does not
interfere any more in the Lebanese businesses, should be understood like an
invitation to the Syrian government to respect the resolutions of the United
Nations, the independence of Lebanon, and the absence of destabilization of
safety in Lebanon, during the current period of the presidential election
campaign.
7
The democratic Western world and in particular the United States of America are
for the respect of the democracy and the Lebanese Constitution. They advise the
application of the Constitution in the prescribed times to lead to the election
of a president before the end of the mandate of Emile LAHOUD on November 24,
2007, which was extended under the Syrian occupation.
8
The army is penalized in an urban combat since May 20, 2007 in the camp of Nahr
El Bared with the terrorists of <Fateh Al Islam>. The Lebanese martyrs exceed
140 victims. The camp is practically shaven.
9
The General Michel SOLEIMAN, chief of the army, in spite of the American
logistical support of the Lebanese army, has surprised by his untrue
declarations to have said that the group <Fateh Al Islam> does not have bonds
with the Syrian regime! Such declarations do not have any interest except if he
has aiming to seize the power with a Syrian support!
II - Texts of the Constitution and the
Agreement of TAEF, relating to the presidential election.
A - Article 49 of the Lebanese Constitution [Presidential Powers].
(1) The President of the Republic is the bead of the state and the symbol of
the nation's unity. He shall safeguard the constitution and Lebanon's
independence, unity, and territorial integrity. The President shall preside
over the Supreme Defense Council and be the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces which fall under the authority of the Council of Ministers.
(2) The President of the Republic shall be elected by secret ballot and by a
two thirds majority of the Chamber of Deputies. After a first ballot, an
absolute majority shall be sufficient. The President's term is for six years.
He may not be re-elected until six years after the expiration of his last
mandate. No one may be elected to the Presidency of the Republic unless he
fulfills the conditions of eligibility for the Chamber of Deputies.
(3) It is also not possible to elect judges, Grade One civil servants, or their
equivalents in all public institutions to the Presidency during their term or
office or within two years following the date of their resignation or their
leaving office for whatever reason.
B - Article 73 of the Lebanese Constitution [Election of the President].
One month at least and two months at most before the expiration of the term of
office of the President of the Republic, the Chamber is summoned by its
President to elect the new
President of the Republic.
However, should it not be summoned for this purpose,
the Chamber meets of its own accord on the tenth day preceding the expiration
of the President's term of office.
C - Article 74 of the Lebanese Constitution [Vacancy of Presidency].
Should the Presidency become vacant through the death or resignation of the
President or for any other cause, the Chamber meets immediately and by virtue
of the law to elect a successor. If the Chamber happens to be dissolved at the
time the vacancy occurs, the electoral bodies are convened without delay and,
as soon as the elections have taken place, the Chamber meets by virtue of the
law.
D - Article 75 of the Lebanese Constitution.
The Chamber meeting to elect the President of the Republic is considered an
electoral body and not a legislative assembly. It must proceed immediately,
without discussion or any other act, to elect the Head of the State.
E - Article 79 of the Lebanese Constitution [Majority, Promulgation].
(1) When a draft law dealing with a constitutional amendment is submitted to
the Chamber, it cannot discuss it or vote upon it except when a majority of two
thirds of the members lawfully composing the Chamber are present. Voting is by
the same majority.
(2) The President of the Republic is required to promulgate the law of the
constitutional amendment under the same conditions and in the same form as
ordinary laws. He has the right, within the period established for the
promulgation, to ask the Chamber to reconsider the draft, after consultation
with the council of Ministers, in which case the vote is by a majority of two
thirds.
F - Article 95 of the Lebanese Constitution [National Committee].
(1) The first Chamber or Deputies which is elected on the basis of equality
between Muslims and Christians takes the appropriate measures to realize the
abolition of political confessionalism according to a transitional plan. A
National Committee is to be formed, headed by the President of the Republic,
including, in addition to the President of the Chamber of Deputies and the Prime
Minister, leading political, intellectual, and social figures.
(2) The tasks of this Committee are to study and propose the means to ensure
the abolition of confessionalism, propose them to the Chamber of Deputies and
the Ministers, and supervise the execution of the transitional plan.
(3) During the transitional phase:
a. The confessional groups are to be represented in a just and equitable fashion
in the formation of the Cabinet.
b. The principle of confessional representation in public service
jobs, in the judiciary, in the military and security institutions, and in public
and mixed agencies are to be cancelled in accordance with the requirements of
national reconciliation; they shall be replaced by the principle of expertise
and competence. However, Grade One posts and their equivalents are exempt from
this rule, and the posts must be distributed equally between Christians and
Muslims without reserving any particular job for any confessional group but
rather applying the principles of expertise and competence.
{Let us recall that this text of article 95 of the Constitution was elaborated under the Syrian occupation. There are back thoughts against the independence of Lebanon and balance between the Christian and Moslem cultures. }
G - Elements of the text of the Agreement of TAËF of
1989 having effects on the presidential election.
From Part II of the text of the Agreement of TAËF:
Second, spreading the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon
over all Lebanese territories:
Considering that all Lebanese factions have agreed to the establishment of a
strong state founded on the basis of National Accord, the national accord
government shall draft a detailed one-year plan whose objective is to spread
the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories gradually
with the state’s own forces. The broad lines of the plan shall be as follows:
A. Disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias shall be announced. The
militias’ weapons shall be delivered to the State of Lebanon within a period of
6 months, beginning with the approval of the national accord charter. The
president of the republic shall be elected. A national accord cabinet shall be
formed, and the political reforms shall be approved constitutionally.
D. The problem of the Lebanese evacuees shall be solved fundamentally, and the right of every Lebanese evicted since 1975 to return to the place from which he was evicted shall be established. Legislation to guarantee this right and to insure the means of reconstruction shall be issued. Considering that the objective of the State of Lebanon is to spread its authority over all the Lebanese territories through its own forces, represented primarily by the internal security forces, and in view of the fraternal relations binding Syria to Lebanon, the Syrian forces shall thankfully assist the forces of the legitimate Lebanese government to spread the authority of the State of Lebanon within a set period of no more than 2 years, beginning with ratification of the national accord charter, election of the president of the republic, formation of the national accord cabinet, and approval of the political reforms constitutionally. At the end of this period, the two governments — the Syrian Government and the Lebanese National Accord Government — shall decide to redeploy the Syrian forces in Al-Biq’a area from Dahr al-Baydar to the Hammana-al-Mudayrij-’Ayn Darah line, and if necessary, at other points to be determined by a joint Lebanese-Syrian military committee. An agreement shall also be concluded by the two governments to determine the strength and duration of the presence of Syrian forces in the above-mentioned area and to define these forces’ relationship with the Lebanese state authorities where the forces exist. The Arab Tripartite Committee is prepared to assist the two states, if they so wish, to develop this agreement.
From Part IV of the text of the Agreement of TAEF:
Fourth, Lebanese-Syrian Relations:
Lebanon, with its Arab identity, is tied to all the Arab countries by true fraternal relations. Between Lebanon and Syria there is a special relationship that derives its strength from the roots of blood relationships, history, and joint fraternal interests. This is the concept on which the two countries’ coordination and cooperation is founded, and which will be embodied by the agreements between the two countries in all areas, in a manner that accomplishes the two fraternal countries’ interests within the framework of the sovereignty and independence of each of them. Therefore, and because strengthening the bases of security creates the climate needed to develop these bonds, Lebanon should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat to Syria’s security, and Syria should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat to Lebanon’s security under any circumstances. Consequently, Lebanon should not allow itself to become a pathway or a base for any force, state, or organization seeking to undermine its security or Syria’s security. Syria, which is eager for Lebanon’s security, independence, and unity and for harmony among its citizens, should not permit any act that poses a threat to Lebanon’s security, independence, and sovereignty.
III - Analysis of the LSTDO
vis-a-vis the polemic of the interpretation of the Constitution and the
Agreement of TAEF concerning the presidential election.
A - If the Lebanese were really democratic and respectful of the Constitution, the election would have been simple.
1
Subparagraph 3 of article 49 of the Constitution is clear and precise.
It does not require a quorum of two thirds of the deputies at the election of
the first turn. There does not need the presence of two thirds of the
deputies so that the session is lawful. It is specified simply that the
president is elected in the first turn, if he has at least two thirds of
the deputies of the Parliament. But, if in the first turn, no candidate has two
thirds of the deputies, then the following election turns permit the
candidate who gains an absolute majority (of half of the deputies registered in
the Parliament and one moreover) to become president of the republic. On the
whole, on 128 deputies of the Lebanese Parliament, it is enough that 65 deputies
meet to vote and if they all are in favor of only one candidate, it will be a
president of the republic at the second turn.
The legislator could have
written clearly that we need a quorum of two thirds to begin the vote. He did
not write it. He is right. Indeed, we need an obligatory mechanism which ends in
the election of a president of the republic. No blackmail and no petty
negotiation of private interest must block this election. All the citizens can
stand as a candidates to the presidency of the republic. At the beginning of the
selection, each candidate is supported by a minority. The final choice is done
by contest or gathering. The fact of having 50% of the deputies for a candidate
is already an important majority because the opponents are not inevitably plain
on only one program or for only one candidate. The competition which leads to
choose, in the last turn, one of the two best placed candidates before the last
turn, is the only democratic solution to impose an obligatory election of the
president of the republic without blocking.
Let us point out the difference with the vote for a constitutional law where the
presence of two thirds of the deputies is required:
< Article 79 of the
Constitution [Majority]
(1) When a draft law dealing with a constitutional amendment is submitted to
the Chamber, it cannot discuss it or vote upon it except when a majority of two
thirds of the members lawfully composing the Chamber are present. Voting is by
the same majority. >
The State can continue without constitution modification but it can not
function without a president.
2
This analysis is perfectly constitutional. If the Lebanese were of democratic
culture without violent spirit, the transition of the State power could be done
in peace, because currently the group of March 14 has an absolute majority at
the Parliament. The automatism of the selection of a president of the republic
would have been even easier if the Constitution envisaged a selection with
several turns to be able, at the last turn, to choose between the two best
candidates of this selection. This is a reflexion for the reform of the
Constitution in the future.
3
The notion of the absolute majority, of half plus one, is already difficult to
obtain in the current constitutional conditions. In the Western democracies one
is satisfied with the majority of the voters. The absent ones and the white
votes are not entered. If for example the absenteeism is 40% of the population,
it is enough to have 30% plus one of the registered voters on the
electoral rolls, i.e. 50% plus one of the voters who chose, to be elected.
4
Under such conditions of true democracy, an agreement between political groups
which are opposed is not necessary. Moreover the agreement of a great reinforced
majority (unanimity) is not possible except in the countries of dictatorships
where strongest prevent the weak ones from being expressed using the threats and
violence. But in a democracy where freedoms are preserved, they are the voters
who choose in theory the best candidate who is appreciated by the greatest
possible number of the voters. This scenario of a simple transition of the State
power in Lebanon in peace is unfortunately difficult to obtain because of the
passion and excessive indoctrination of the population associated with the
ideological and denominational interferences in the Middle-East.
5
The opposition by the voice of General AOUN disputes the legitimacy of ten
deputies of the majority on defects at the time of the legislative elections on
June 2005.
The majority had blocked the operation of the Constitutional Council and it is
not possible any more to judge this dispute before the presidential elections.
This is why voices of the opposition consider that the majority had stolen the
power and that it is actually minority.
This reasoning is not acceptable for a democrat who must know that at the time
of the Syrian occupation all the persons in charge for the Lebanese State were
controlled, chosen and subjected to the Syrian will. To date, the majority of
Lebanese do not have confidence in the legal system and in the Constitutional
Council which are still cored by <pro Syrians>.
To arrive at the State power, General AOUN believed good to be bonded with her
enemies of yesterday, the pro Syrians. This alliance is against a democratic nature because
the Free Patriotic Movement fights for the democracy and the independence of
Lebanon.
If General AOUN is responsible for this political fault which is likely to be
very expensive to the Lebanese democrats, we say that the current majority of
government SANIORA is responsible for this disaster as much. Indeed, the chiefs
of the current majority had put obstacles at the participation of General AOUN
in the government in spite of his strong representativeness of the Christian
community of Lebanon. His movement was marginalized wrongfully. He was thrown
into the hands of the pro Syrians.
Taking into account the political forces on the ground, we think that the
Lebanese democracy needs an agreement of the majority with the Free Patriotic
Movement and if possible with all the moderate and democratic deputies among the
opposition. This hope is currently reduced.
B - But Lebanon presents constraining characteristics
which make the presidential election at the absolute majority a factor of
destabilization of the country.
1
Religious mistrust between the Christians and the Moslems is ancestral and
requires a certain balance in the participation of the State powers to improve
the climate of confidence and tolerance between these two principal religious
cultures in Lebanon. This balance is necessary in spite of the appearance of
laic currents which remain minority. The civil and family laws are
not the same ones between the religious communities. These cultures subjected to
the religions have been anchored in the spirit of people for two thousand years
and no law can change this situation in a fast way. The project of suppression
of denominational balance within the Lebanese State according to article 95 of
the Constitution which was modified under the Syrian occupation is unrealizable
in Lebanese democracy in the visible future. Mistrust is ancestral and any
imbalance in the division of the capacities of the State will be prone
conflicts. But the Syrian regime had behind thoughts in the suppression of the
confessionalism in the balance of the State to rock the power in favor of the
Moslems who are more numerous than the Christians. Thus, in the second time, the
Syrian regime could have definitively annexed the Lebanese territory to Syria.
The exodus of the Christians of the Middle-East towards the occident has
continued for 14 centuries. The Christians of Lebanon now form a minority close
to half of the alive population on the Lebanese ground. If there is no real
correction in religious balance within the capacities of the Lebanese State,
this country will evolve to an annexation by Syria and the final disappearance
of any Christian authority to the Middle-East.
2
Religious mistrust between the Sunnite Moslems and the Shiite Moslems has been
worsened for several years at the time of the religious indoctrinations carried
out by politico religious groups and the conflicts between these two confessions
in the close States. For forty years, the Alaouite Shiites of Syria have
dominated the Sunnites by the dictatorship of ASSAD family . In Iraq, Saddam
HOSEIN, Sunnite dictator, had massacred the Shiites in several occasions, before
losing his State power. Affinities exist between the Lebanon Shiites, the Syria
Shiite of and the Iran Shiite. The Sunnites of Lebanon have affinities with the
Sunnites of Egypt, Jordan and the Arabic peninsula. Modern telecommunications,
the media and the presence of the common Arab language to these various
countries, facilitate propaganda and the religious excitation. Then, terrorists
appear more quickly than in the past with repercussions in Lebanon where the
various communities are mixed.
The weakened Christians in Lebanon do not have sufficient means to preserve the
independence of Lebanon vis-a-vis the Syrian means. This is why today the future
of Lebanon is played according to the will of the Druses and Lebanese Sunnites
who tested the Syrian regime since the occupation of Lebanon during 40 years.
They understood that alliance with the Christians of Lebanon is capital to
restore and to preserve the independence of Lebanon.
3
Part of the Lebanese Moslems consider that they belong to the Arab world, with a
Moslem Arab nation where Lebanon is only a part. It is the consequence of the
use of the religion to indoctrinate people in the direction of the desires of
the religious chiefs. The history of Lebanon shows that we are the
descendants of the Phoenicians. The occupations and the replacements of
religions by others through the centuries do not prevent from concluding that
Lebanese are Phoenicians whatever are their religions. The people who do not
feel initially Lebanese or Phoenicians represent a fish pond to be used by the
hostile Arabic regimes such as the Syrian regime to make terrorism and
assassinations in Lebanon.
4
The feudal practices into the Lebanese State facilitate blackmails, violence,
pressures, compromising, corruption, and blockings of the action of the State by
private interest groups which fight to take part into the State power at the
detriment of the citizen. The politicians in Lebanon are rarely seldom
personalities of exemplary morality who want to work for the service of the
public interest. Often, one finds opportunist people, go-getters, attracted
people for the power and the money, and who make of the policy a trade. In this
climate, the foreign interferences in Lebanon are easy by financing some private
interest groups.
5
The impoverishment of the majority of Lebanese makes them subjected and
flexible in favor of the feudal families which share the State powers and its
money since tens of years. The continuous exodus of the dissatisfied Lebanese
young people made it possible these feudal families to keep the system in their
favors without any true democratic revolution. We permanently attend debates
between political chiefs on subjects of participation into the State powers
because of the balances between religious communities. But very seldom that one
sees debates on truth problems of the Lebanese society as regards the social, or
economic, or industrial aspects, and the quality of the public services.
6
This climate of mafias which fights for the power makes it possible to
understand why clans change alliances easily. Violence and assassinations emerge
brutally from time to time.
7
The handling of terrorists or political groups by the Syrian regime which does
not recognize the independence of Lebanon poses a serious problem of the
destabilization and the will of Syria to dominate the power of the Lebanese
State.
8
The Palestinian camps in Lebanon lodge approximately 400 000 refugees of 1948
and 1967 exodus, whereas the population of Lebanon does not exceed 4 millions on
a primarily mountainous territory of 10500 km ². These Palestinians live under
inhuman conditions of poverty, promiscuity and illiteracy. It is a fertile
ground for terrorism. Lebanon does not have the means of regulating their
problem. The charity of the Arab countries and the Western countries does not
regulate their cause. The Syrian regime already used them since 1969 to organize
violence in Lebanon and to justify the entry of the Syrian army in Lebanon in
1976. They are again used by the Syrian regime under revolutionary nominations
to destabilize Lebanon. One knows already <Fateh Al Islam>, translated into <
Conquest of Islam> in violence of the camp of <Nahr El Bared >. Acts of violence
are asserted by < Jound El Cham>, translated into < Damascus soldiers >! But one
should not generalize, the majority of Palestinians are brave and pacifist.
9
In addition to the small pro Syrian armed groups in Lebanon, there is the
armament of the party of God, HEZBOLLAH, which poses the problem of a State into
the Lebanese State. This party succeeded in dominating the Shiite population of
Lebanon. It is armed and financed by Syria and Iran and thus radio-controlled by
these two countries. They constitute alliances to opposit against SANIORA
Government.
10
On the whole, the opposition which is armed and supported by the Syrian
regime requires an agreement on the choice of the future bearable president by
two thirds of the deputies and the future government of national agreement and
threat to create violence in all the country if the election would be made
according to an absolute majority of half plus one.
11
Because of the needs for a balance into the State power, between the various
religious communities in Lebanon, the Shiites should be represented equitably in
the government. The two combined Political movements, AMAL and HEZBOLLAH,
dominate the representability of this community at the Parliament thanks to the
means of HEZBOLLAH out of weapons and money, and the electoral law of the year
2000. The south of Lebanon and Bekaa are under their domination. They have means
for a possible rebellion against the democratic government.
12
In the Agreement of TAËF of 1989, made under the pressure of the Syrian
occupation, we have passages which are presented in top in this text and which
show the will of the Syrian regime to dominate the Lebanese governments. In
thirty years of occupation, this Syrian regime had prepared part of the Lebanese
Moslems to the pan Arabic indoctrinations. Thus today and in spite of the
departure of the Syrian army, this regime has means inside Lebanon to
destabilize the democratic government.
C - Peace in Lebanon is difficult to preserve by the simple application of the Constitution in the presidential election.
1
If the Constitution is respected, the future president of the republic will come
from the current majority.
2
But the threat of a armed confrontation with the pro Syrians, in particular
HEZBOLLAH, is a serious danger of civil war, which will be stupid and
destructive, but wanted by the Syrian regime. I am persuaded that the
Shiite people do not want a war. But the armed militia are nourished by the
Syrian regime. Groups
3
The LSTDO has also doctrines but which are humanistic, scientist and modern, and
who summarizes himself by the following sentence: “I work to delay death and to
improve the quality of life of any human being among all people”.
We are not for the war. We seek the dialogue to get along. We fight against the death and the misery of the beings of all the people. We refuse the management of our life according to what can occur after our death.
But that does not want to say tender, abandonment, treason of our moral and democratic principles.
The Lebanese democrats must protect themselves. It is necessary to have military means to protect themselves but without any aggressiveness against the Lebanese prosyrian ones. Pro Syrians should nevertheless be prevented from harming to the people of Lebanon and the independence of our democratic State.
Since Resolution 1559 of the United Nations in 2004, and
according to the agreement of TAËF in 1989, all the armed militia on the
Lebanese ground must return its weapons to the Lebanese State, including the
militia of HEZBOLLAH. The Syrian regime did not respect its promises. It had
disarmed and degraded the Lebanese freedom fighters . It had armed and
indoctrinated its allies to make the < Large Syria>
4
The LSTDO, by having of research of peace, proposes to the opposition deputies
an agreement with the following conditions:
1 - Hezbollah and all the other militia in Lebanon must be committed to give their weapons to the Lebanese army and acting only under the authority of the democratic Lebanese government.
2 - Hezbollah must be committed having relationships to the Syrian regime and the Iranian regime only on the plan of the friendships, the cultural and commercial relations. No interference in the Lebanese political businesses can be allowed. No importation of weapons is accepted without the agreement of the government. The political relations between the Lebanese and these two countries are allowed only through the diplomacy of the Lebanese State.
3 - Hezbollah must admit that Lebanon is definitively independent, laic and democratic with balance of all the authorities of the State between Christians and Moslems on all the levels of the State.
Under these conditions, we think that the Shiite community of Lebanon has a full right to take part in the authority of the State on all the levels to a total value of 25% of manpower and means of the State. The Sunnites, the Christians Maronites and the Christians not Maronites will take part in the capacities of the State to a total value of 25% for each one of these groups.
A candidate at the presidency of the republic would then be supported by the majority and the opposition on these bases of agreement.
5
If the political chiefs of the pro Syrians groups do not accept this proposal,
we keep the hope that most of the Shiites of Lebanon would revolt against their
chiefs to prevent the creation of a civil war and then to elect, in the next
parliamentary elections, different and moderate deputies.
6
Let us recall that as a last resort, the Lebanese Constitution allows the legal
election of a president by the vote of 65 deputies that the majority of < the
Revolution of the Cedar > has.
Also let us recall that the armed forces of the United Nations in Lebanon did
not come to annex this country but to preserve its independence and the safety
of its people. The democratic government must use all the means including the
economic and military aids of the democratic countries to preserve the peace and
the independence of Lebanon.
7
After having posed truths problems which separate the opposition from the
parliamentary majority, one understands that the squabbles, which continue
between the various Lebanese politicians by handling interpretations of the
Constitution according to their desires, are ridiculous. Essence is the
existence of weapons into the hands of armed pro Syrian groups which want
to take again the authority of the Lebanese State. If they do not arrive by the
diversion of the laws and the elections, they threaten to use their weapons. We
are not in a democratic step, but in a war open between the democrats and the
pro Syrians dictators .
8
Thus, the democrats must remain on the defensive position to prevent the terrorists from
harming. They can have patience for a possible agreement with the moderate ones
of the opposition to choose a president supported by two thirds of the
Parliament. But, on November 14, 2007, if there is not such an agreement,
the < the Revolution of the Cedar > has the duty to carry on its way towards
independence and the democracy by choosing a president supported by half plus
one of the deputies, pursuant to article 49 which is clear and precise.
LINKS :
Solution of the Lebanese Political Crisis of the summer 2007, by two years Limited Period with a Provisional President, a Provisional Vice-president and a precise Program of Government.
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_LSTDO / Presidential campaign analysis, 08/31/2007 _
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